naval war college and the u.s. review editor for the journal of strategic studies. he's the author of an excellent new book called "fixing the facts -- national security and the politics of intelligence." he also contributed an essay after pro-live case, deterrence theory and emerging nuclear powers to a book titled "nuclear strategy in the second nuclear age -- pound-for-pounder, ambition and the ultimate weapon." he's written articles on intelligence reform, politics and strategy, nuclear proliferation and deterrence and he completed a post doctorate fellowship at williams college. so that, i think, clearly established the bonifieds of everybody on the panel to discuss military options, containment options, squared off against nuclear or nuclearizing iran. so i will turn the podium over to matt.

>> thank you very much for that introduction. i was here just about a year ago talking about my last book and it was in the old auditorium. it's nice to be here in the new digs. this is really a beautiful auditori auditorium. as justin said today, we're here to talk about iran's nuclear program. there's wide agreement that iran's rapidly advancing nuclear program opposes perhaps the greatest emerging national security challenge for the united states. and deciding on how to deal with it is the most important issue in facing the united states government today. as i see it, there are only tlooe ways this issue is going to be resofled. first, we could get some kind of diplomatic settlement with iran. second, we could simply act' es to a nuclear armed iran or third, we or israel could take military action. now, clearly the diplomatic settlement would be ideal if we could get it. but i think there's very good reason to believe we can't.

in fact, it's really hard to imagine any overlap between what iran's supreme leader would be willinging to agree to and what would simultaneously reassure washington and reassure the international community that iran's nuclear program is no longer a threat. so as we all know, the p 5 plus 1 in iran are returning to the negotiating table on april 13, but iran stated publicly they're going to be unwilling to even discuss the iranian research program and a european diplomat when asked about the prospects of a settlement said, the only hope he could provide us was maybe miracles happen. so if diplomacy fails as, i think, it's likely to. that means sometimes the united states is going to face this difficult decision between acoo w -- acquiescing or taking action.

a nuclear armed iran would likely lead to greater proliferation in the region. iran itself would become a nuclear supplier, transferring uranium enrichment around the globe. a nuclear iran would become more aggressive. right now it restrains its foreign policy because it fears major action with united states or israel. but with nuclear weapons it could be emboldened to push harder. it could deter major action. if iran is throwing its weight around in the region, the region could be nor crisis proned. any one of these crises could spiral out of control. i don't think iran would intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, but given the polar

nuclear environment, i think that there are a lot of possibilities for accidental or inadvertent nuclear exchange. given the small size of israel, a nuclear exchange involving israel could very well mean the end of the state of israel. and once iran has ballistic missiles capable of reaching the east coast of the united states, which experts estimate could be in as little as five years, one of these could result in nuclear exchange on the east coast of the united states. so these are serious threats that the united states would have to deal with. so as president obama said, a nuclear iran is unacceptable. a u.s. military strike could almost certainly destroy iran's key nuclear facilities. this could set iran back.

i estimate it would set iran's program back between three to ten years. iran could end up permanently without permanent weapons. there's a significant upside to a strike. there are also down sides to military action. i think that these risks are often exaggerated and aren't quite as severe as many people believe and that united states could put in a straty to mitigate many of these down side risks. it's important to understand that iran doesn't have a strong conventional military. rather that i ear developingcy symmetric military attacks. it could cause problems in the persian gulf, up to and including of closing the strait of hormuz.

we have to think, what would iran do? iran would have its own strategic dilemma after the strike. on one happened, it would want to strike back to save face domestically and internationally, on the other hand, its primary goal is to continue to exist. so it's not going to want to pick a fight with the united states .the one country on earth that could very well start a conflict that would lead to the end of the iranian military is, the current regime. so iran is going to aim for some cab brated response if they strike back. if they strike back they can save face but if they strike back too hard, they'll lose. the united states ask put in place a clear deterrent strategy and communicate to iran that we're only interested in the key nuclear facilities, we're not interested inform overthrowing the regime. i think by making that message very clear, we can prevent iran in crossing certain red line,

such as closing the strait of hormuz, conducting major terrorist attacks in the united states, or using chemical and biological weapons. and make it clear to iran if they cross those red lines we would be willing to engage in a bigger fight. but if they stop short of that, we would be willing to trade the nuclear program for some sort of retaliation. if the united states finds itself choosing between a nuclear armed iran and a strike, and i think the point in which we would have to headache that decision is if iran kicks out regulators. i think we should work to build an international coalition, conduct a surgical strike on ir iran's key nuclear facilities, pull back and absorb an inevitable round of iranian

retaliation and work to deescalate the situation. it's better than the alternative of living with the dangers of a nuclear armed iran for decades. so thank you. thank you. i will take the opposite position as you might imagine. i'm going to talk about three things. twha are the possibly end games with all these situations with iran. what would be the results of not attacking iran and finally, what would be the results of not attacking iran. i think there's a difference of what my view of the end game may be and matt's view of what the end game might be. i think a grand bargain ask likely, but i don't think there's just strike or

acquiesce. there's strike, acquiesce but also convince them to maintain but do not weaponize is an end game. a con kwens of attack is it makes this end game less likely. the more we antagonize iran on this topic, the less they will be per saided that latent capability is sufficient. it's more likely they will weaponize in the end. on the consequences of not attacking iran, there's three consequences that matt mentioned that are usually mentioned in this context. one is nuclear emboldenment, what they will do if they get nuclear weapons. the next one is the possible that other states would follow suit. and the final one is the likelihood of accidental exchange of a nuclear level in a future conflict in the middle east. the first one emboldenment, it's

important to notice first of all that it depends on the weaponization of the iranian nuclear program. that is em bold issenment would happen if the iranians actually weaponize their nuclear capability, but with a latent nuclear capability, it's hard to figure out how the iranian regime would feel emboldened internationally if it doesn't actually assess a weapon. but the ski question to us, i haven't seen a good answer to the question is, what are the actions? the actions the iranians would like to take that we would no longer be able to deter if they required nuclear weapon. what is it iran wants to do that it can't do today that it doesn't have nuclear weapons but could do in the future if they have nuclear weapons. i haven't seen a good answer to this question. buzz it want to close the straits of hermuz, provide more advanced weapons to hezbollah?

all of these actions would threaten the vital states of iran, even if it possessed nuclear weapons. you could make the argument that particularly if it has nuclear weapons it would face nuclear retaliation if it takes any bold action against israel or the united states. because we're not in the habit of launching nuclear attacks on nonnuclear states, but if iran insists on weaponizing, it is possible they would suffer a devastating nuclear strike. and so i don't think that nuclear weapons change the iranian regime's determination to survive, and i don't think that nuclear weapons change the fact that iran cannot prevail against an israeli-u.s. coalition. so i don't know which of the actions that iran would like to take and can't take now, which of those it would take the future chur as a result of having nuclear weapons that would, in fact, create serious

trouble for advertise reel and the u.s. while at the same time not risking the survival of the iranian regime. still on this question of involvement, if we strike iran preventively, we can expect the iran regime to be particularly rational and indeed restrained in their response. we can tell them, we're only going after the nuclear program so don't go overboard in your reaction. and matt expects them to react with great restraint. but once they acquire nuclear weapons, there's a sort of magic potent respect where they become unrestrainable. so it changes in a way where they become a grave threat to international stability. whereas if we attack them now, they will oactually be kind of okay with it and take a strike on the crown jewel of their regime with aplomb and without

going overboard in their reaction. i think you have to have it one way or the other. you can't have it both ways. the possibility of having it both ways means an attack cannot be limited because the iranians would retaliate en masse or is not necessary if the iranians are so restrained they would not strike back in an attack, it's likely they would be restrained once they have nuclear weapons. it's possible to have a limited strike and a necessary strike. the second point i would like to talk about in terms of consequences of a potentially nuclear iran, or la tent capability is the possibility of a nuclear cascade. and this is the in the middle east. this is the three effects of not striking iran, the one that's more likely to obtain, even if iran acquires a latent

capability. it would be vital that other states in the region would follow suit. the states we're talking about, usually egypt, iraq, saudi arabia and turkey. sort of a cascade of proliferation in the middle east. i would like to note a couple of things on this topic. first, the u.s. has existing security assurances vis-a-vis states based on their current capabilities, without the need to spend more money than we're already spending that give these allies little incentives to nuclearize. in fact, i would say there is no example of a u.s. ally on which the u.s. exerted significant pressure against nuclearization that still went ahead and acquired the bomb. the u.s. has been consistently successful in preventing its allies from proliferatinprolife. the case of pakistan, we could look at one day, the u.s. was not successful in stopping proliferation.

turkey is the second largest military in nato and is under the u.s. formal security umbrella. iraq is more complicated. it will either turn to towards iran, in which it won't nuclearize in response to iran or turn against iran, in which case it will get u.s. support. it's unlikely in my view that even iranian weaponization would result in a nuclearive cascade in the middle east. the third point matt makes would result from iranian nuclear acquisition is accidental nuclear exchange. in the context of a crisis, you

act capitol hill need a weapon in the context of a crisis .but even if you have one, the argument that matt makes is iran and u.s. and iran and israel lack the communication channels and assurances that allowed us to deescalate the number of crises. but i would like to note, for instance, the hottest crisis of the cold war is before we have robust communication channels with the soviets. it's before the soviets have a long experience of managing a large arsenal. they had a large arsenal for five years at most during the cuban missile crisis. it's unclear whether they had retaliation capability and still they backed down. so we have actually -- we can use history to make the opposite points. eit would leave you to believe that's ka lags is a likely event, even in relation to pakistan and india, sint both went nuclear, we have never seen a crisis.

we have seen quite a few crisis. we have never seen it's ka late to the nuclear level. i have four points to make in which i think i differ from what proponents of attack believe. an attack would not be comparable to an attack on syria. this is an analogy that makes no sense. the syrian nuclear program was limited to one facility. we're talking about a couple of weeks of attacks. in fact, if you look at the press, it's an attack that's likely to stretch israel capabilities. israel is no the a particularly weak country conventionally. we're not talking about koun strike, one day. we're talking about a couple of weeks, a month of consecutive bombing and then assessment. that's far more costly and far more like live to generate reaction from iran than i think proponents of an attack think.

the second point is that the result in an attack with iran, and agree with matt is that it would not end a program, it would delay a program. we disagree on how many years but we agree that the program would not be ended. the 1981 attack on the reactor, if anything, we know from the documents that came out of iraq led saddam to double his efforts. and he only dropped the program around 1995 as a result of sanctions regime. so the sanctions regime would be the aftermath of the attack. we would need to per swa i had iran not to weaponize so an attack is not the end point. alas, an attack would decrease the likelihood we would be able

to disassemble the containment regime in place. that is, if we attack, we make it harder to contain iran, and therefore less likely that iran would be persuaded to not weaponize its nuclear program. while at the same time, it would be, and this is the third effect. its result would be busted by an attack. that it requires a nuclear program to defend itself. it would be even less likely we would be able to persuade them not to weaponize. so iranian result is actually great already, i think. i don't have any doubt that they are pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, not the weapon itself. but i think it would be even redoubled in terms of resolve if we attack them. the final consequence of an

attack is the likely end game would become weaponization. so it's lk less able to persuade iran to settle for latet capability after an attack. we should heed the lessons of north korean weaponization. the u.s. was gravely concerned with the aftermath of a north korean bomb, but he haven't seen emboldenment. we certainly have not seen a nuclear cascade. the u.s. has been able to maintain its robust assurances to japan, south korea, preventing a cascade. we haven't seen escalation during the crisis around thanksgiving a couple of years ago. we haven't seen any escalation on the part of north korea. i think it would be a better model to look at -- a better template to look at this case than the possibility of a strike succeeding. thank you.

>> i want to thank cato for inviting me. i often spar with cato scholars on a variety of issues. i appreciate the invitation and the willingness to air a diverse set of opinions on this issue. i'm in a bit of an odd position because i've been at least on one other panel with matt discussing this issue. i agree with matt on certain aspects of his argument, and actually found myself agreeing with nuno and i assume with my other colleague as well on some aspects. but i think this is a very important issue we need to be discussing. i think we need to remember that this is not something that's just come upon the international scene. this is a problem that's essentially been a slow motion train wreck unfolding in front of our eyes over more than the last decade. it's been six years that the u.n. security council has been dealing with iran -- with the iran nuclear file after it was referred by the international

atomic energy agency. if you look, as the previous panel discussed, i think it's fairly clear that i think engagement, the diplomatic approach is not working. we'll see another meeting here in several weeks. but i don't have high hopes that much will come of that meeting between the p5 plus 1 and iranian negotiations. i think sanctioave avt changed regime's basic calculus about its nuclear program. and, thus, i end up where matt does that we need to seriously consider the military option. and i'd just say up front, i think one thing, we have a range of viewpoints being presented here. but let's not fool ourselves. given where the obama administration has staked out its position, and i think some people in the q&a in the last session got into this. the obama administration has already narrowed its set of options just in its rhetoric. president obama has said very clearly that containment is not his policy. i think it's going to be very difficult for him, and i don't think he has any interest in shifting that approach, even if it comes to this decision that

he may need to make probably some time after re-election if he's re-elected, to potentially take the military option. where i differ with matt is that i don't think a limited strike is the answer. and the reason is, and this is also why i have concerns about containment because i think that we're overlooking the fact that to borrow or to basically take a phrase from james carville, it's the regime, stupid. it's the nature of the regime that is the problem that we're facing right now with iran. it's not just its nuclear activities. it's a broader set of issues. and even if we could get to the point of some serious discussions with the current regime in iran, it would be very difficult to take anything seriously that they agreed to and believe that we could actually trust them given their past deceit about their nuclear activities. just to remind everyone, this is a regime that for decades has been killing americans and u.s.

allies both directly. most recently via lethal support to militias and militants in iraq and the taliban in afghanistan. it has longstanding support for terrorist groups like hamas and hezbollah. it has a horrible human rights record, executing more people per capita than any other country in the world. and especially since the crackdown against the green movement in june 2009. the number of imprisonments of journalists, human rights defenders and political activists has significantly increased. it also has for years contributed to general instability in the middle east which have impacted global energy markets and undermined u.s. and allied interests. so before i get to the details of my critique of matt's argument in favor of a limited strike, i'll talk first about why not containment? responding to some of the issues that nuno raised. i think even if you set aside, and as i will, i think you can have a debate about the impact on israel's interest about whether iran would actually ever

use a nuclear weapon against israel, whether it would transfer nuclear technology to terrorist groups like hezbollah. i'm going to set those issues aside. i think you can have a debate about that. even if you don't care or aren't moved by those concerns, i think alone the cascade of proliferation that will result, i'm not as convinced as all as nuno is that this is something that can be avoided. i think that's in large part why president obama has staked out the position against containment that he has. the cases that i think nuno would rely on to argue that we've been successful in dissuading states from going nuclear in the past, i find it hard to basically transfer the case of japan, for instance, to that of saudi arabia. i would challenge nuno to tell me what american leader is going to tell the american people that we should extend our nuclear umbrella and protect riyadh in the same way we protect london, berlin or paris. because of the difference in culture, because of the difference in values and the fundamental fact that saudi

arabia and a lot of the countries we would need to try to dissuade from doing this are not democracies, i don't think the american people are going to be ready to take the steps through treaty or other means to ensure that these countries do not -- so i think we would see a cascade prove liveeration. i do think that again, regardless of whether actual nuclear technology is transferred to terrorists you would see iran's terrorist proxies emboldened in their attacks both against israel and activities elsewhere around the globe. i do think that we also have to be concerned about the inherent instability of the regime. and again, even if you don't believe that the regime is irrational, if you believe that the regime would never actually use nuclear weapons, it is likely most analysts believe that this regime is not going to last perhaps even five years given the political opposition, given the broader trends within the region. who knows through what a coup or other actions who may end up with control of nuclear weapons,

even if the current regime is considered rational. i think one final concern we need to raise is, again, even if it's not a planned move on the part of the iranian government to share nuclear technology, all we need to do is look at the case of pakistan. a lot of the current cases we were dealing with around the world of countries aspiring to seek nuclear weapons have been significantly aided by the aq kahn network which there are varying reports about how much the pakistani government knew or encouraged that network. but it's something that basic proliferation of nuclear technology is something we need to be concerned about. it's another reason that north korea case, i think, is instructive. north korea has been a problem. it has not been an issue that has not had any impact on u.s. or allied security interests. north korea has proliferated nuclear technology. it's been an extensive proliferator of missile technology to a number of countries. and these are all things we

would need to be concerned about if we had an iranian regime with nuclear weapons. so getting beyond the containment discussion, when you look at the military option it certainly is not a good option. if we were truly serious about taking military action, the time to strike was probably a number of years ago when the program was much smaller, less spread out and would have been easier to destroy with the limited strike that matt advocates. it also, i agree with nuno, it's a very different program from iraq's program in the '80s or the syrian program that the israelis destroyed. just today, i read a bloomberg news article before i came over about a new crs report that cites a variety of cent rufuj workshops. the workshops where centrifuges and the component parts are produced and how israel and the united states likely don't know the locations of all of those facilities. so it would be very difficult to take out in a limited strike.

so what i advocate is a more extensive strike. i finishing the united states gets to the point of actually weighing the military option, any u.s. military option is usually not done in a limited way. it would involve taking out iran's air capabilities, probably go after some of their missile sites that could be used to respond. probably go after some of the revolutionary guard corps's naval facilities to help prevent or deter its ability to close the strait of hormuz and so if this operation is already being carried out, is already going to last several weeks as nuno mentioned, why not expand the target list to go after command and control elements, to go after elements of regime repression that have been used against the iranian people? and basically try to create a space for the opposition to perhaps rise up in a ramped up, more extensive version of what we did in libya and hope t